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Europe at 21: Transitions and 
Transformations since 1989 
 
1 
If, as I believe (Outhwaite: 2008), there is something that can be called European 
society, it seems fairly uncontentious that the two most important things that have 
happened to it are marked by the years 1989, the annus mirabilis of the 
anticommunist revolutions in central and eastern Europe, and 2004, the year of the 
EU’s eastern enlargement.1  Both these years need to be understood in an extended 
sense. ‘1989’ began at least as early as 1988 in Poland and perhaps Hungary and 
might, though this is more contentious, be extended to cover the dissolution of the 
USSR in 1991 and the ‘colour revolutions’ which are still continuing.  2004, similarly, 
needs arguably to be extended back to the ‘Enlargement without Accession’ (Spence, 
1991) of 1990 in Germany and forward to the 2007 accession of Bulgaria and Romania 
and the impending accession of Croatia and other future member states.  And the 
two core years are of course linked: 1989 was not a sufficient condition for 2004, but 
it was certainly a necessary one.  We can ask whether 1989 could have come earlier, 
say in 1968 with the Prague Spring or 1980 with the rise of Solidarity, or maybe a 
decade later without Gorbachev.    
If 1789 was the defining event of the modern political imagination, it remains to be 
seen what place will be given to the anticommunist revolutions of 1989.  On the one 
hand, the ‘long’ 1989 running from Gorbachev’s rise to power in 1985, or the reforms 
which he initiated soon afterwards, to the end of the USSR in 1991 marks the end of 
the Cold War which, we should never forget, could easily have killed us all.  As 
                                                        
1
 For Robert Cooper (2003: 3), 1989 was the most important date for the European state system 
since 1648, since it marks the end of the Westphalian state model.  Here again, the rise of the EU, 
along with globalisation, are the positive complement to this.  The title of this article reflects my 
sense that 1989 marks the rebirth of a politically unitary, if not yet fully unified Europe.  
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events in global risk management go, it doesn’t get much bigger than this.  On the 
other hand, a number of commentators have stressed the absence of really new ideas 
in the 1989, especially after the rapid eclipse of civil society movements like 
Solidarity in Poland or Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia; Habermas, for example, has 
called it the ‘catching-up’ or ‘rectifying’ revolution; a return to democracy (and 
capitalism), and to the ‘normal’ path of post WWII European development.2 
Similarly, the ‘new world order’ proclaimed by President Bush I was already looking 
threadbare long before the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001.    
In Europe, what had begun as a reaction to the consequences of nationalism in the 
two world wars had been developing gradually and haltingly into a new political 
model: an ‘ever closer union’ of more and more European states.  The ultimate 
destination or finalité of what has become the European Union remains more or less 
as unclear as when Andrew Shonfield (1973) examined it in his Reith Lectures in 
1972. Briefly, however, the EU is incipiently postnational, despite or because of its 
continuing symbiotic relationship with its member-states.  It is post-imperial, in that 
however much it might superficially come to resemble the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
it will surely retain principles of democracy more characteristic of the national state 
(Beck and Grande 2004).  And it is perhaps (and this is part at least of its appeal), the 
beginning of a form of post-European cosmopolitan democracy attractive not just to 
Europe but to many other parts of the world.  Jürgen Habermas (1991) has aptly 
described this as ‘Europe’s second chance’.  The continent or subcontinent exported 
not just political and cultural modernity, which on the whole people want, and 
capitalism, which they either want or see as inescapable, but also a nation-state 
structure which, whatever may be said in its favour, was clearly also responsible for 
war and genocide.  Wherever we might want to locate Europe on the spectrum 
between ‘top of the world class’ and the disruptive world bully deserving exclusion, 
its balance sheet in the second half of what we eurocentrically call the second 
millennium is at least ambiguous.    
                                                        
2 In an alternative analysis, Dick Howard (2009) has argued that 1989 did offer an alternative 
political model but that the west failed to respond to it. ‘Without a sympathetic echo from the 
West for their renewal of political life rather than simply for their casting off of communism, the 
critical forces in the East were overwhelmed…’    
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I shall return to this theme at the end, after looking more closely at 1989 and 
postcommunist transition.  There is a further dimension to an inquiry into 1989. A 
long-standing lament in the philosophy of social science is that the problems of the 
social sciences, their low level of development relative to the natural sciences and 
their relative lack of what Giddens called ‘revelatory power’ can be partly explained 
by the impossibility of experimentation, except at the most trivial and small-scale 
level.  Without going into the details of those debates, we can at least welcome the 
fact that communist and postcommunist Europe does offer something like an 
experimental situation: Stalinist ‘socialism in many countries’ after 1945, followed by 
postcommunist transition more or less rapidly after 1989.  The two processes differed 
of course in that Stalinisation was supposed to be a more or less homogeneous and 
homogenising process (as reflected in the German slogan: ‘learning from the Soviet 
Union means learning to win’). Divergencies such as the abandonment of 
agricultural collectivisation in Poland were seen as dangerously deviant (and 
sometimes invoked to explain the weakness of socialism in Poland). Postcommunist 
transition, by contrast, was supposed to be a process of liberation towards a set of 
freely chosen alternative futures – which makes the degree of observed convergence 
interesting in itself.   
1989, then, raises issues of the periodisation and explanation of the origins of what 
Jowitt (1992) called ‘the Leninist extinction’.  There are substantial disagreements 
over the role of dissidence and the relative importance of revolution from below and 
implosion or state collapse (or mutation) from above.  This in turn raises the even 
more fundamental and wide-ranging question, which I shall concentrate on here, of 
how exceptional 1989 was in the chronology of post-communist transition.  On one 
reading, which I tend to favour, it was the fore-runner of what has happened or is 
likely to happen relatively soon in the rest of the originally communist world.  
People power in Ukraine in 2004 is not, I think, fundamentally different from people 
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power in Leipzig, Berlin or Prague in 19893; Belarus in 2010 confronts many of the 
same issues as the communist states in 1988 or 1989.  
On the other reading, which also has a lot to be said for it,4 1989 is exceptional in 
introducing a genuinely democratic transition process which was continued in the 
Baltic states but not in other parts of the former Soviet Union.  On the one hand we 
have democracies which, despite difficult challenges, can meet the Copenhagen 
criteria with more or less ease5; on the other are at best ‘managed’ or ‘sovereign’ 
democracies and at worst persistently authoritarian states.   
Václav Havel’s memoirs (2008: 21-3) provide an interesting angle on this issue in 
some reflections following a meeting with Yushchenko in Washington in 2005 where 
he presented the following analysis:  
after the fall of communism… there arose in most countries of the 
former Soviet bloc a transitional phase that we might provisionally call 
‘postcommunism’.  It’s a period of unprecedented and rapid 
privatization not yet contained within a solid, tried-and-true legal 
framework and in which, naturally, the former communist 
nomenklatura, or communist enterprise managers, took a significant 
part…In subtle ways, the economic power links up with political power 
and the power of the media to create something I once called Mafia-
capitalism, though it could equally be called Mafia-democracy… 
But as the years go by and a new generation comes to maturity, the 
public gradually begins to lose patience with that state of affairs, until 
one day it revolts. And what happens then is a kind of second-
generation revolution or – more precisely – a completion of the 
original revolution…And just as postcommunism has a slightly 
different form in each country, the revolts against it are different as 
                                                        
3 Ukraine had in fact seen one of the most innovative dissident groups of the late 1980s: the ‘Lion 
Society’ of Lviv (Kenney, 2002: 123-30). For a more sceptical view of ‘colour revolutions’, see 
Lane 2009.  
4 Larry Ray (2009: 322) takes this line, arguing that ‘the 1989 pattern of regime change appears 
to be exceptional and actually part of the emergence of an increasingly differentiated and 
uncertain world system.’   
5 At least the first two (liberal democracy and market economy). If the third (support for closer 
political integration) was interpreted strictly, it is not clear how many old or new member states 
would qualify.   
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well: revolt can sometimes take the form of a surprising shift in voter 
support (that’s how the Slovaks settled with Mečiarism), at other times 
the peaceful pressure of popular demonstrations (Georgia, Ukraine).  
The particular importance of the Ukrainian Orange revolution is not, 
however, that it took place in such a large and important country in the 
former Soviet empire or that it inspired many countries still burdened 
with postcommunism, but in something perhaps even more 
significant; that revolution gave a clear answer to a still open question: 
where does one of the major spheres of civilization in the world today 
(the so-called West) end, and where does the other sphere (the so-
called East, or rather Euro-Asia) begin?      
We might take issue with Havel’s Eurocentrism, but the important point, I think, is 
his notion of a shared postcommunist condition, in the particular way in which he 
defined it,6 and a continuity between the earlier and later phases of the transition. 
 
3 
We do not know, I think, either as analysts or as policy-makers, how optimistic or 
pessimistic to be about this situation, or about where the line between genuine and 
pseudo-democracies is likely to fall in the coming years.  What we can do, as well as 
following current developments as closely as possible, is to look back over the period 
from 1989 to the present and at the interplay between what the biologist Jacques 
Monod (1970) called chance and necessity (see also Sarotte, 2009: 210-14). In three at 
least of the 1989 revolutions, sheer accident played a crucial part.  The best known is 
the opening of the Berlin Wall, which rapidly escalated into its destruction.  Another 
is the rumoured death of a demonstrator in Prague on November 17th.  In the event, 
like the premature announcement of the opening of the Berlin Wall, it escalated 
instead into the unexpected success of the revolution. This was a provocation by the 
secret police, who caused one of their own undercover agents to ‘die’, in the hope 
                                                        
6
 Jacques Rupnik (2007: 30) recalls that he used the term in the same way in an interview with 
Rupnik in Le Monde, 24 February 2005, defining postcommunism as ‘un mélange de régime 
autoritaire et de capitalisme mafieux’. 
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that this would provoke the crowds into actions which would justify a crack-down 
by the police and the authorities.7  And if President Ceausescu had realised how the 
rally on 22 December would turn out, with the crowds not cheering but jeering, he 
might have chosen instead to give a fireside TV speech. 
As Havel’s reflections suggest, the most fundamental question is perhaps the 
analysis of 1989 itself.  To cut a long story short, if we see 1989 less as a victory for 
the people and more as the outcome of strategies adopted by elites to preserve their 
position by other means, the less the contrast with the post-Soviet scene.  Looking 
from the West, we tend to ask why the East has so far ‘failed’ to achieve liberal 
capitalism and democracy. Looking from China, the question is perhaps a different 
one: why did communist elites in the Soviet bloc fail to retain power while 
embarking on a necessary marketisation of the economy?8  It is clear, I think, that we 
need to keep both lines of analysis, top-down and bottom-up, in play at the same 
time.  And we should avoid assuming necessary differences, dictated by geography 
or political culture, where there is more like an interplay between structures and 
contingencies. 
There are models for this sort of analysis in, for example, Theda Skocpol’s States and 
Social Revolutions.  Skocpol stressed the interaction between social pressure from 
below and state crisis at the top, and she also, though only in a footnote, noted that 
‘…social-scientific analyses of revolutions almost never…give sufficient analytic 
weight to the conjunctural, unfolding interactions of originally separately 
determined processes (Skocpol, 1979: 320, quoted in Sewell, 2005: 97-8).  Looking 
further back, among the first social theorists to address the theme of the intersection 
of structural factors and contingencies was Montesquieu.9  Tocqueville is also 
relevant here, and his methodological reflections on writing the history of the times 
remain highly pertinent.   
                                                        
7 Garton Ash (2000:438) interviewed the officer, by then working as a pawnbroker, and asked 
him how he “died”. He replies, ‘Well, really I just fell over’.   
8 I remember a visit to Sussex by a Chinese delegation at the end of 1989 whose leader stressed 
the irrelevance to China of what had just happened in Europe.   
9 As well as The Spirit of the Laws, see also Montesquieu’s ‘Essay on the Causes That May Affect 
Men’s Minds and Characters’ and Melvin Richter’s ‘Introduction’,  Political Theory 4, 2: 132-162. 
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…the details become known only by posthumous revelations and are 
often unknown to contemporaries.  What contemporaries know better 
than posterity is the movement of minds and general passions of the 
times of which they feel the last tremors in their own minds and 
hearts.  It is the true relationship between the principal actors and the 
principal facts, and between the great historical movements, which 
those close to the times described perceive better than posterity.  It is 
for posterity to write the history of details.  Those close to the events 
are better placed to trace the general history and general causes, the 
grand movement of facts and current of opinion of which men who are 
placed too far away cannot form an idea because such things cannot be 
learned from memoirs. (Tocqueville, 1856: 150-1)  
I might mention here two other relevant theoretical resources. One is Saskia Sassen’s 
notion of ‘capabilities’, developed in one context but then ‘jumping tracks’ and 
operating in a different way in another. Sassen (2008) is concerned with capabilities 
developed in the late medieval period but also operating in the national-state order 
and those moving similarly from the national-state system to the global order. (An 
example of the latter would be the Bretton Woods currency system, developed just 
after World War II in the world of national states but prefiguring the institutions of 
globalism.) Shifts of this kind produce what she calls the ‘illegibility of social 
change’:  
That which has not yet gained formal recognition can often be an 
indicator of change, of the constituting and inserting of new 
substantive logics in a particular domain of the social…which is 
thereby altered even though its formal representation may remain 
unchanged… 
One of my concerns here is deciphering deep structural shifts 
underlying surface continuities and, alternatively, deep structural 
continuities underlying surface discontinuities.  This then also rests on 
my conceptualization of certain conditions and dynamics as 
capabilities that can jump tracks and wind up lodged in path 
dependencies that diverge from the original ones.    
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(Sassen, 2008: 12).     
An approach of this kind is very helpful in thinking about the interplay of the old 
and the new in postcommunist transition.  Ken Jowitt, whose work is substantially in 
this area, looks out similarly, without much enthusiasm, for the new vanguard:  
For each new way of life there must be a social base uprooted from its 
previous identity, available for a new one, attracted to and validated by 
the features of the new ideology; a social base from which a new elite 
stratum emerges: courtiers in absolutist states, ascetic entrepreneurs 
in liberal capitalist states, Bolshevik cadres in Leninist regimes, and 
the SS in the Third Reich… 
…the emergence of a new way of life requires the existence of a core 
site generating, concentrating and then ‘exporting’ a surplus of 
leadership talent and resources to the ‘unreconstructed’ society it 
intends to transform: Versailles, Cluny, THE Party, London, Rome, 
Mecca-Medina, and Gdansk all played this creative role. (Jowitt, 1992: 
267-8)10  
In the postcommunist case, I suspect one would have to think in terms of multiple 
strata of ‘winners’:  some entrepreneurs, some reformist politicians, some intellectuals 
and so on.  The sites too would be multiple: stock exchanges and business schools 
certainly, but also educational organisations and programmes sustained by Soros 
and other NGOs. 
 
4 
What then happened in 1989?  I shall begin with a ‘Western’ perspective and then 
move to an ‘Eastern’ one.   
One of the central issues here can be briefly stated as follows. What I have tried, 
somewhat speculatively, in my contribution to a forthcoming collective volume on 
                                                        
10 He is, or at least was, ‘looking out’ for this in both senses of the term: in a slightly later essay, he 
writes that ‘it will be demagogues, priests, and colonels more than democrats and capitalists who 
will shape Eastern Europe’s institutional identity.’ (Jowitt, 1992: 300) 
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The Global 1989, to present as ‘postcommunist universals’ may or may not be of 
relevance outside the area of East Central Europe which has attracted most attention 
on the literature on postcommunist transition.    
Ezra Vogel wrote at the end of the 1960s of ‘communist universals’ (one-party state, 
planned economy, etc.),11 and is worth asking what we might categorise as 
postcommunist universals.  Among these are: 
1) a relatively peaceful transfer of power, sometimes involving a ‘transition 
pact’ or ‘handshake’ between the old elites and   
2) a broad-spectrum political opposition movement, such as Solidarity in 
Poland, Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia or Sajudis in Lithuania, which tends 
to break up soon after the take-over along familiar or less familiar lines of 
political division. 
3) an economic (and therefore social) ‘transition shock’, amounting to 
something from two to five or more years of negative growth (‘transition 
recession’) and enterprise closures, unemployment, high suicide and 
mortality rates etc. 
4) discrediting, often followed by relatively rapid rehabilitation, of previously 
ruling communist parties, this sometimes including purges and 
5) ‘lustration’ – the exposure of members of earlier elites and others 
(including members of the anticommunist opposition movements) found to 
have collaborated with the security police. 
6) Finally, a pattern of politics characterised by a quite substantial degree of 
egalitarianism (or at least opposition to growing inequalities) but without 
forms of class-based politics still found in much of non-postcommunist 
Europe. 
                                                        
11 See Chalmers Johnson (1970) and Tőkes (1997: 109). 
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These processes modulated differently in different states (or, in the Czechoslovak 
case, different parts of what was then the same state), but what is striking in 
hindsight is the degree of convergence.12  The bulk of formerly communist Europe is 
now in the European Union, as noted earlier, with economies and political regimes at 
least sufficiently respectable to satisfy the accession criteria. The striking differences 
in initial conditions, such as the substantial private sector and opposition in Poland, 
contrasting with virtually no private sector and an almost entirely underground 
opposition in Czechoslovakia, may have influenced the initial political shape of the 
transition but seem to have had rather little long-term effect.  The same goes for the 
violent postcommuist transition shock in Poland (and, in a different form, in 
Germany), contrasting with a more gradualist approach in the Czech and Slovak 
republics.   
Elsewhere in the former communist bloc, however, models of elite continuity, well 
analysed by Tucker in another chapter of The Global 1989 concerned with China and 
Russia, may be more appropriate.  For Tucker (ms. p. 1), ‘Post-totalitarian Russia and 
China emerged from a process of the adjustment of the rights of the late-totalitarian 
elite - the nomenklatura – to its interests…the evolution of the totalitarian ruling class 
from revolutionary to capitalist.’  He concludes (ms. final page): ‘1989 was actually 
more global and less revolutionary than has hitherto been acknowledged.’     
An intermediate position between the approach with which I began, focussing on the 
central European 1989 as the ideal type, and Tucker’s model of a global process of 
elite recycling, running ‘from China through Russia to Central Europe’, is the fairly 
conventional one of drawing some sort of geographical dividing line.  This is what 
was practised de facto by policy-makers, notably (and after a considerable delay) by 
the EU, and many academic analysts.13 The fault-line between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
                                                        
12 In the original models of convergence popular in the 1950s and 1960s, the alleged process was 
seen as being driven by the functional imperatives of industrial society. In the 1990s, 
convergence was driven by external imperatives, varyingly identified as globalisation, the 
influence of outside advisors (Wedel, 1998) and the increasing influence of the European Union 
(see Outhwaite and Ray, 2005: chapter 4).  In Germany, of course, there was a more or less 
immediate implantation of Western practices (Thumfart, 2002), and the EU was present from an 
early stage (Spence, 1991).  
13 There is a useful critical discussion by Jeffrey Klopstein (2009). 
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versions of postcommunist transition, with the 2004 accession states roughly on one 
side and the rest of the bloc mostly on the other, again raises issues of the interplay 
between long-term influences of entrenched patterns of social and political 
organisation and short-term contingencies such as the eclipse of Mečiar, which 
shifted Slovakia more or less overnight in 1998 from one side to the another – at least 
in the optic of the EU and other influential international actors.   
 
5 
Whatever view one takes of continuities, subterranean forces and so on, it makes 
sense to start with a kind of phenomenology of transition: the way in which it 
appeared to protagonists and observers at the time.  Here one can rely, with all due 
caution, on contemporary writing and retrospective memoirs, interviews etc.   
I begin then with the Stunde Null of the 1989 handovers.  (The Czechoslovak case is 
perhaps the most clear-cut here, since elsewhere there had mostly been a more 
gradual process of undermining the old regime and incubating the new.)14  There are 
crudely three reasons why one might do something in the early days, such as abolish 
the secret police or central economic planning, or perhaps initiate a privatisation 
programme or a purge of the former elites: 
1) You want to do it 
2) You are under some sort of pressure to do it 
3) Others are doing it and you go along with it 
First, there is the question who ‘you’ are.  In Poland and Hungary, there was a fairly 
well established counter-elite, whereas in Czechoslovakia there was not much more 
than a cluster of dissidents with a penumbra of sympathisers.  As Havel (2007: 55) 
puts it, ‘we had no entr’acte of perestroika or reform communism, but we started 
                                                        
14 There are of course important and controversial issues here about the role of dissidence across 
the bloc in the run-up to 1989.  See for example Wydra, 2007.  
Europe at 21 
 
 
12 
directly, after a few days of revolution, to build a normal democratic society’.  On the 
other hand, however, as Wheaton and Kavan (1992: 117) point out, in 
Czechoslovakia 
The existence of networks and a more or less ready-made leaders 
contrasts with the situation in Romania and East Germany, where the 
party provided the leaders for the revolutions. Further, the Czech 
dissidents had contacts and sympathizers, even as high as the upper 
echelons of the party…   
Even in Czechoslovakia, then, there was considerable continuity, notably at the very 
top, where Deputy Prime Minister Marian Čalfa became transitional Prime Minister 
in the ‘government of national understanding’ set up on December 10, 1989, just 
three weeks after the November 17 rally (and was later reappointed by Havel after 
free elections). 
As Havel (2007:72) recalls it,  
He told me quite clearly that the Communist Party had lost power, that 
there was no point in even talking to it, and that he, as the top 
negotiator for the state, would make the decisions with us, Civic Forum 
and the Public Against Violence, on the mechanisms of the transition of 
power… 
Ultimately, it was Čalfa who taught the new government how to 
govern.  There was not a lot that was specifically communistic in what 
you call the ‘technology of power’ once the leading role of the 
Communist Party no longer applied, and things were no longer 
decided first in the Politburo.  The government simply meets on 
certain days; there’s an agenda, there are procedural rules, the 
ministers have to receive their briefing materials in time, and so on… 
There could be no question of just ‘dismantling’ the existing structures. Instead, ‘We 
tried to fill existing posts with new, uncompromised people and then, by democratic 
means – that is, by passing constitutional and ordinary laws - to carry out the 
systemic changes we were able to agree on as the most necessary and the most 
important.’ (Havel 2007: 69-70).  He goes on to point out (p.71) something 
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documented by many surveys, notably those conducted by Richard Rose and 
summarised in Rose 2009, that where communist party membership was so 
widespread, it does not mark a significant difference in political attitudes.  
Here, then, is one of the less ‘pacted’ transitions in the bloc, and even here the 
continuities are striking. The Czech experience may suggest caution in taking too 
pessimistic or conspiratorial a view of transitions further to the east.  
 
6 
What then were the options in 1989?  I shall mention here only two obvious ones, 
‘no-brainers’ if you like; the abolition of the secret police and of central planning of 
the economy.  Even for the first of these, however, the demobilisations in Central 
Europe took a month or more and, in the case of the German Stasi, a massive 
demonstration (Sarotte, 2009: 96-7).  At the other extreme is the outlying case of 
Belarus, where the KGB has not even been rebadged, as in Russia, but proudly 
continues under its old name.  In the Czechoslovak case, interestingly, Havel (2007: 
106) explains the fact that it took a month to disband the StB as follows:  
The secret police had countless buildings, both known and unknown, 
all over the country.  We didn’t occupy them most probably because 
we had no army or police division that was both loyal to us and well 
informed.15  
The later policy of ‘lustration’, which went further in Czechslovakia than anywhere 
else except Germany, was introduced substantially because of fears of a communist 
come-back (Wheaton and Kavan, 1992: 179-182).  Of the immediate post- 
revolutionary period, Havel (2007: 62) comments: 
We talked a lot at the time about setting up a kind of ‘ethical tribunal’ 
to render a verdict on the moral and political responsibility for 
                                                        
15
 See also Wheaton and Kavan, 1992: 136-7 
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conditions under the previous regime, but there obviously wasn’t the 
appetite, or even the energy, for that. 
The saddest thing of all is our miserable record in successfully 
prosecuting actual crimes. The state of our judiciary was clearly a 
factor here.     
On the second issue, the replacement of central planning by a market economy, there 
were more open choices over the speed and modalities of the transition.16  Here, the 
picture rapidly becomes complicated by the intrusion of outside ‘experts’ and, 
eventually, of the European Union.  We are entering, in other words, a terrain well 
mapped by analysts such as Janine Wedel (1998) for the ‘advice industry’ and Wade 
Jacoby’s analyses of processes of imitation or ‘ordering from the menu’ (Jacoby, 2000, 
2002, 2004). 
As Larry Ray and I have argued (Outhwaite and Ray 2004), 1989 was in at least one 
way a bad time for the revolutions: the neoliberal heyday meant that economic 
policies were quite unnecessarily destructive and the prospect of a second Marshall 
Plan for postcommunist Europe rapidly faded. There was, however, quite a lot of 
talk of such a thing; Janine Wedel (1998: 29-30) writes that, although the US had 
ruled out a Marshall-type action by May 1990, it was only in 1993 that Witold 
Trzeciakowski, who had been aid coordinator in Poland in 1989-90, realised that it 
was not going to happen. Whereas Marshall Aid after WWII had been 90% in grant 
form, this was the case for only 10% of aid to postcommunist Europe up to 1992. In 
brief, therefore, the economic decline was unnecessarily harsh, and contributed to the 
limitations of already weakened socialist organisations such as trade unions and 
women’s movements, and of the oppositional and critical civil society which had 
attracted such optimistic hopes.17   
I have concentrated mostly here on the national state level, but any fuller account of 
the postcommunist decades must also explore the international context of 1989 
(Sarotte 2009) and the growing transnational impact of the EU. The latter theme has 
                                                        
16 On privatization programmes across the bloc, see Frydman et al, 1993.  For the Czechoslovak 
case, see Wheaton and Kavan, 1992: 154-64) 
17 On this, and on its effects on postcommunist politcs, see Ost, 2005.  
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perhaps tended to fall between the two stools of a focus on the EU’s enlargement on 
the one hand, and on the politics of individual states on the other; the excellent study 
by Vachudová (2005) is a welcome exception. In Vachodová’s analysis, the EU’s shift 
after the Copenhagen summit from ‘passive leverage’, which merely reinforced 
liberal tendencies in countries already on that path, to ‘active leverage’ which 
changed the balance of political forces in more marginal countries such as Slovakia 
and enabled political elites to groom them for eventual accession, was a crucial 
contribution.  
The EU, like the West as a whole, was slow to respond to the needs of post-1989 
Europe, but its long-term impact has been massively beneficial overall. Unlike the 
situation in Western Europe, no postcommunist state has rejected the option of 
membership and none seems likely to. Having reinforced differences between 
postcommunist states in what has been aptly called the ‘regatta’ towards accession, 
the challenge for the Union is to develop common policies to reduce the dangerous 
inequalities which persist between member states. EU accession has often been taken 
as a marker for the end of postcommunist transition, and with border-free travel, 
currencies pegged to, or already replaced by, the Euro, it is easy to slip into this way 
of thinking. But we need also to bear in mind the persistence of the past, both in the 
theme of postcommunism as a ‘return’ to capitalism, national independence and so 
on (Lagerspetz, 1999) and in the viscosity of social structures which was so often 
overlooked in the early 1990s.  The postcommunist or postsocialist condition remains 
determinant (Stenning and  Hörschelmann, 2008; Ray, 2009).  
To cut a long story short, then, the role of the EU is increasingly crucial as the 
postcommunist decades unfold.  While I am not concerned with the minutiae of 
enlargement and accession, they are clearly at the heart of the processes examined 
here - first as a long-term prospect (except of course in Germany) and then as a more 
or less imminent reality, drawing one state or group of states after another into the 
acquis communautaire or the backwash which it creates for those outside.  The 
question of what sort of Europe is emerging in the twenty-first century is not 
reducible to a set of questions about the evolution of the European Union, as it is in 
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some of the more EUrocentric literature, but the political shape of the more or less 
united Europe which is emerging cannot but be a central concern.18  As Sobrina 
Edwards (2005; 2009) has shown, there were two ways in which the 2004 
Enlargement was presented: first, as simply the next in a series of enlargements and, 
second, as a historic moment of the reunification of a Europe divided since WW2.  It 
was of course both, with the accession shock in much of postcommunist Europe now 
falling between the transition shock and the 2008-10-? economic crisis.   
Overall, I think one has to conclude that the enlargement process has been 
remarkably uneventful.19  There are however two related and worrying 
developments: a slide in both parts of the formerly divided Europe to what has been 
called post-democracy and a degree of estrangement between old and new member 
states.  As Jonathan Freedland wrote recently (The Guardian, 21.10.2009), in a 
shocked response to the British Conservatives’ bizarre choice of allies in the 
European Parliament,  
It’s become bad form to mention it, because we are meant to be 
friendly towards the newest members of the European Union.  But the 
truth is that several of these ‘emerging democracies’ have reverted to a 
brand of ultra-nationalistic politics that would repel most voters in 
western Europe.  It exists in Poland and Latvia, but also Lithuania, 
Estonia, Hungary, Romania and beyond.   
Since this was the same month in which a British neofascist leader was given a 
prominent place on a television programme, it is important to stress that this is a 
problem for Europe as a whole and not just for postcommunist Europe.  At the risk 
of trivialising an important issue, I suggest we apply to postcommunist politics, and 
that of Europe as a whole, what I call the BBB test, referring not to A Level grades 
required for university admission but whether a particular political leader is a bigger 
bastard than Berlusconi.  Several suspect postcommunist politicians indeed pass this 
test, but others fall mercifully short. 
                                                        
18 In a paper first delivered just before the 2004 accession round (Outhwaite, 2006), I addressed 
the issue of cosmopolitanism versus Fortress Europe.    
19 Rupnik (2007: 10) describes as one of its best-kept secrets that this was the Union’s ‘greatest 
success’ since 1989. 
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To draw a provisional conclusion, it may be that the search for a Stunde Null is 
fruitless, except through the benefits of the search itself. Postcommunist states are 
perhaps less like trains, switching at a precise point from one track to another, than 
planes or ships which can make ongoing course changes.  It remains the case that 
postcommunist Europe offers the spectacle of a wide variety of countries and regions 
emerging from a relatively similar state into one which is a good deal more open, yet 
shaped by the past and by underlying structures and contingent events in all sorts of 
different ways.  ‘There is no way I will be a laboratory rabbit for any new 
experiment’, said an East German emigrant in late 1989 to William Echikson (1990: 
25), explaining his unwillingness to return even to a changed GDR.  The sentiment is 
entirely understandable, but the predicament inescapable for those who remained.  
Postcommunist transition, even in Germany, could not but take the form of an 
experiment – for better or worse for those embedded in it, but to the undoubted 
benefit of comparative researchers. 
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